We consider a simple network model for economic agents where each can buy goods in the neighborhood. Their prices may be initially distinct in any node. However, by assuming some rules on new prices, we show that the distinct prices will reach an equilibrium price by iterating buy and sell operations. First, we present a protocol model in which each agent always bids at some rate in the difference between his own price and the lowest price in the neighborhood. Next, we show that the equilibrium price can be derived from the total funds and the total goods for any network. This confirms that the inflation / deflation occurs due to the increment / decrement of funds as long as the quantity of goods is constant. Finally, we consider how injected funds spread in a path network because sufficient funds of each agent drive him to buy goods. This is a monetary policy for deflation. A set of recurrences lead to the price of goods at each node at any time. Then, we compare two injections with half funds and single injection. It turns out the former is better than the latter from a fund-spreading point of view, and thus it has an application to a monetary policy and a strategic management based on the information of each agent.
INTRODUCTION
Motivation. Conventionally, the topics of price determination have been discussed in the context of microeconomics approach (J. E. Stiglitz, 2006) . In supply and demand curves, if the price is higher (resp. lower) than an equilibrium, there is excess supply (resp. excess demand) and thus the price moves to the equilibrium. At the equilibrium price, the quantity of goods sought by consumers is equal to the quantity of goods supplied by producers. Neither consumers nor producers have an incentive to alter the price or quantity at the equilibrium. Since such a conventional approach cannot capture each person's behavior, it is difficult to reflect actual economic phenomena. So we considered a multiagent network model (J. Kiniwa and K. Kikuta, a; J. Kiniwa and K. Kikuta, b) , in which each agent makes auctions and the price of goods is eventually determined. Our network model consists of nodes and edges as cities and their links to neighbors, respectively. Each node contains an agent which represents people in the city. Agents who want to buy goods make bids to the lowest-priced neighboring node, if any. Then, agents who want to sell the goods accept the highest bid. The process of price stabilization can be shown by using the idea of self-stabilization in distributed systems (S. Dolev, 2000) . From any initial state, self-stabilizing algorithms eventually lead to a legitimate state without any aid of external actions. We notice that the properties of self-stabilization resemble those of price determination in convergence to a equilibrium without external operations. of funds / goods. We assume that the price is proportional to the amount of funds and inversely proportional to the amount of goods at each node. Furthermore, the volume of trade is assumed to depend on the price difference between cities. As a result, the flow of money and goods is determined by the market principles, and thus the equilibrium price can be explained reasonably. Furthermore, it confirms that the inflation / deflation depends on the amount of funds as long as the amount of goods is constant. Related Work. The classical theory of price determination in microeconomics is introduced, e.g., in (J. E. Stiglitz, 2006; N. G. Mankiw, 2012) , and a survey is in (T. A . Weber, 2012) . We review the theory from multiagent points of view. Though several economic network models have been already known (L. E. Blume, 2009; E. Even-Dar and S. Suri, 2007 ; S. M. Kakade and S. Suri, 2004) , such models contain a bipartite structure (E. Even-Dar and S. Suri, 2007; S. M. Kakade and S. Suri, 2004) or traders who play intermediary roles (L. E. Blume, 2009) . Agent-based stabilization has been discussed in (J. Beauquier and E. Schiller, 2001; S. Dolev and J. L. Welch, 2006; S. Ghosh, 2000; T. Herman and T. Masuzawa, 2001 ). Unlike our agents, their ideas are to use mobile agents for the purpose of stabilization. It is useful in designing protocols by what price we should make a bid. Several kinds of game theoretic flavors have appeared in self-stabilization, e.g., time complexity analysis (S. Dolev and S. Moran, 1995) , strategies with optimal complexity (S. Dolev and P. Tsigas, 2008) , relationships between Nash equilibria and stabilization (A. Dasgupta and S. Tixeuil, 2006; M. G. Gouda and H. B. Acharya, 2009) . Our protocol in Section 3 can be considered as a kind of consensus algorithm. The consensus algorithm in decentralized systems is described in (N. A. Lynch, 1996) , and its self-stabilizing version is described in (S. Dolev, 2000; S. Dolev and E. M. Schiller, 2010) . Contributions. We consider an inflation / deflation network model, where the price is proportional to the amount of funds, and is inversely proportional to the amount of goods at each node. First, we present a protocol in which each agent always offers a fixed price without considering other bidders' strategies. Then, we show that an equilibrium price is determined by the total amount of funds and goods, and confirm that inflation / deflation is determined by the amount of funds. Next we focus on path networks and reveal the price of each node and the amount of funds of each node at each time. Finally, we show that the injection of funds from two points is more effective than that from a single point.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 states our model. Section 3 shows that our protocol can stabilize distinct goods prices. Section 4 analyzes the behavior of our protocol in detail. Section 4.1 investigates an equilibrium price in an arbitrary network. Then, Section 4.2 estimates the amount of funds at any node at any time for path networks. Furthermore, it suggests an effective fundinjection method for a central bank. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
MODEL
Our system can be represented by a connected network G = (V, E), consisting of a set of nodes V and edges E. In the network G, an arbitrary pair of nodes i ∈ V and j ∈ V represent cities and an edge (i, j) ∈ E between them, called neighbors, represents direct transportation. Let N i be a set of neighboring nodes of i ∈ V , and let N + i = N i ∪ {i}. We assume that each node i ∈ V has goods and their initial price may be distinct. Let p i (t), or denoted by p i , be the price of goods at node i for the time step t ∈ T = (0, 1, 2, . . .). Each node i ∈ V has exactly one representative agent a i who always stays at i and can buy goods in the neighborhood N i . Each agent a i has funds f i , that is, the total amount of money at i, and the quantity q i of goods at i. The price p i is determined by the relationship between the quantity of goods and the purchasing power, or called supply-demand balance. So we simply assume that the price is proportional to the amount of funds for constant goods (Figure 1 (a)), and is inversely proportional to the amount of goods for constant funds (Figure 1(b) ) at each node, that is,
The buy operation is executed as follows. Each agent a i assigns a value v j i (t), or denoted by v j i , to the goods of any neighboring node j ∈ N i , where the value means the maximum amount an agent is willing to pay. Agent a i compares its own goods price p i with the neighboring price p j . If the cheapest price in N i is p j and is less than p i , the agent a i wants to buy it and submits a bid b j i (t), or denoted by b j i , to node j. We consider v j i (t) = p i (t) for any j ∈ N i because he can buy it at price p i (t) in his node.
The sell operation is executed as follows. After accepting bids from N j , agent a j contracts with a i ∈ N j , an arbitrary one of agents who submitted the highest bid b j i . Then, a j passes the goods to (receives money from) the contracted agent a i until the price p j (t +1) becomes b j i derived from the supply-demand balance. We do not take the carrying cost of goods into consideration but focus on the change of prices. In this way, at every time, any price is updated if necessary. The state Σ i of each node i ∈ V is represented by the price, the quantity of goods and the amount of funds
We assume a synchronous model, that is, every agent periodically exchanges messages and knows the states of neighboring agents. The global state of all nodes is called a configuration. The set of all configurations is denoted by Γ = Σ 1 × Σ 2 × · · · × Σ |V | . An atomic step consists of reading the states of neighboring agents, a buy / sell operation, and updating its own state. Then, a configuration is changed from c j ∈ Γ into c j+1 ∈ Γ (or c j+1 is reached from c j ) by the atomic step. An execution E is a sequence of configurations E = c 0 , c 1 , . . . , c j , c j+1 , . . . such that c j+1 ∈ Γ is reached from c j ∈ Γ.
PROTOCOL DESIGN
In this section, we consider a protocol model, called FundBidding, in which each agent a i always makes a bid b
with the lowest price in the neighborhood. For simplicity, let k be a constant rate so that b j i lies between p j (t) and p i (t), where the price may not be an integer.
FundBidding
• Each agent a i makes a bid
where k ≥ 1, to node j ∈ N + i which has the lowestpriced goods in N + i .
• The agent a j contracts with the neighboring a i who has submitted the highest bid max i∈N j b j i (t). If a j has submitted his bid to neighboring node at the same time, it is postponed until the next time step. The goods of a j and the money of a i are exchanged, that is, the goods are moved from q j to q i and the money is moved from f i to f j as long as p i > p j . The prices p i (t + 1) and p j (t + 1) are determined by the funds and the amount of goods.
• If several agents make bids to node j with the same highest price, agent a j makes deals with one of them at random.
Example 1. Figure 2 shows an example of our network system consisting of 4 nodes V = {1, 2, 3, 4}. At time t + 1, the prices become (p 1 (t + 1), p 2 (t + 1), p 3 (t + 1), p 4 (t + 1)) = (80, 80, 70, 10) as shown in Figure 2 We are concerned with whether or not the prices of goods eventually reach an equilibrium price even if they are initially distinct. So we define the legitimacy of a configuration as follows.
For the bidding price (2), let k = 2. At time t, the prices of goods are (p 1 (t), p 2 (t), p 3 (t), p 4 (t)) = (50, 110, 70, 10) as shown in Figure 2(a). Each agent a i wants to buy the lowest-priced goods at node j ∈ N i if its price is lower than p i , that is, p i > min

Definition 1 (legitimate configuration). A configuration is legitimate if the goods in every node have the same price.
⊓ ⊔ Let C t ⊆ V be the set of nodes that have updated their prices from time t to t + 1. The following lemma proves that the protocol FundBidding is free from deadlocks.
Lemma 1. The protocol FundBidding is deadlockfree. That is, there exist some nodes in C t as long as the configuration is illegitimate.
Proof. First notice that no cycle is generated by the chain of bidding requests, as depicted in Figure 2 , because every bidding request occurs from a higher priced node to a lower priced node.
Next suppose that the configuration is illegitimate at time t. Then, there is a pair of neighboring nodes i, j ∈ V such that p i (t) = max h∈N j p h (t) and p j (t) = min h∈N i p h (t), where p i (t) − p j (t) is the maximum price difference in the neighborhood. In this case, agent a i makes a bid to node j and agent a j accepts the price. Since p j (t) is increased at time t + 1, j ∈ C t holds.
⊓ The following theorem further shows that an additional condition leads to the price stabilization.
Theorem 1. (J. Kiniwa and K. Kikuta, b) Suppose that bids have the same order as values. If any contract price lies between buyer's price and seller's price, price stabilization occurs.
⊓ ⊔
Since we assume that v j i (t) = p i (t) for any neighboring node j ∈ N i and a i makes a bid by (2), FundBidding satisfies the condition above.
ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate several aspects of our FundBidding for arbitrary networks and path networks.
Arbitrary Network
The following theorem claims that the equilibrium price is determined by the total amounts of funds and the goods regardless of the network topology. Proof. By definition, the price of goods at node i is p i = f i /q i . Suppose that the equilibrium prices are different for each stabilization process. Then,
Since the total amount of goods Q is identical, we have
Thus we obtain p i (t) = p i (t ′ ), a contradiction. Therefore, the equilibrium price P e is identical for each stabilization process. Next, since f i = P e · q i holds for every node i, the total funds sum up to
Thus we obtain P e = F/Q.
⊓ ⊔
The theorem above is known as the Fisher's quantity equation (N. G. Mankiw, 2012 ) FV = P e Q if the velocity of money V equals to 1. This means the correctness of our assumption (1) at each node. Thus, in our inflation / deflation model, the inflation (resp. deflation) occurs if the total amount of funds increase (resp. decrease) as long as the total amount of goods is constant.
Path Network
In what follows, we restrict our concern to path networks. The path networks probably represent the distance feature in arbitrary networks. Then, we consider how injected funds spread in the path network because sufficient funds of each agent drives him to buy goods. This is a monetary policy for deflation. Section 4.2.1 considers the situation that incremental funds are injected from a single point. Section 4.2.2 considers the situation that the half of incremental funds are injected from two points.
Single Injection
We investigate the amount of funds at each node of a path P = (1, 2, . . . , n) at any time. For simplicity, let k = 2 and let b j i (t) = (p i (t)+ p j (t))/2 in (2). Suppose that we inject funds m into node 1, called an injection point. Let p c i (t) be the temporary, intermediate price of node i reached by trading exhaustively for a contract between t and t + 1. Proof. Suppose that
after the trade, respectively. Let F i−1,i and Q i−1,i be a sum of funds and a sum of quantities of goods at nodes i − 1 and i, respectively. Since no other funds and goods do not come into these values, we have
At an equilibrium, since
This means we can find the equilibrium price before the trade.
⊓ ⊔
The following Figure and Example present a behavior of price diffusion in a path. 
and then
holds. ⊓ ⊔ Thus, in general, the price p j (t) at node j ∈ P (2 ≤ j ≤ n − 1) can be represented as follows.
p j (t) = 1 2 · p j−1 (t) + 1 2 · p j+1 (t − 1) (4) p n (t) = 1 2 · p n−2 (t) + 1 2 · p n (t − 1)
From (4) Using R j (x) = ∑ t≥0 p j (t)x t , we obtain
2R j (x) = R j−1 (x) + xR j+1 (x) + (2p j (0) − p j−1 (0))
For simplicity, we assume 2p j (0) − p j−1 (0) = 0 and replace j by j − 1. Then, xR j − 2R j−1 + R j−2 = 0.
So we have
Using our initial conditions R 0 (x) = ∑ t≥0 p 0 (t)x t = 0 and R 1 (x) = ∑ t≥0 p 1 (t)x t ≈ p 1 (0), 
